Economists often estimate economic models on data and use the point estimates as a stand-in for the truth when studying the model's implications for optimal decision-making. This practice ignores model ambiguity, exposes the decision problem to misspecification, and ultimately leads to post-decision disappointment. Using statistical decision theory, we develop a framework to explore, evaluate, and optimize robust decision rules that explicitly account for estimation uncertainty. We show how to operationalize our analysis by studying robust decisions in a stochastic dynamic investment model in which a decision-maker directly accounts for uncertainty in the model's transition dynamics.

Labor unions influence economic outcomes not only through bargaining with employers over work contracts but also via political activities that can profoundly shape political systems. In unionized workplaces, they may mobilize and change the ideological positions of both unionizing workers and their non-unionizing management. In this paper, we analyze the workplace-level impact of unionization on workers' and managers' political campaign contributions. We link establishment-level union election data with transaction-level campaign contributions to federal and local candidates in the United States. Using a difference-in-differences design, validated through regression discontinuity tests and a novel instrumental variable approach, we find that unionization leads to a leftward shift of campaign contributions. Unionization increases support for Democrats relative to Republicans not only among workers but especially among managers, suggesting that managers converge toward workers' political preferences. The effects are stronger in settings with more cooperative union-employer interactions, such as when union elections are not contested by an unfair labor practice charge and result in a collective bargaining agreement.

Using machine learning methods in a quasi-experimental setting, I study the heterogeneous effects of introducing waste prices - unit prices on household unsorted waste disposal on - waste demands, municipal costs and pollution. Using a unique panel of Italian municipalities with large variation in prices and observables, I show that waste demands are nonlinear. I find evidence of constant elasticities at low prices, and increasing elasticities at high prices driven by income effects and waste habits before policy. The policy reduces waste management costs and pollution in all municipalities after three years of adoption, when prices cause significant waste avoidance.

We study the accuracy of job seekers' wage expectations by comparing subjective beliefs to objective benchmarks using linked administrative and survey data. Our findings show that especially job seekers with low objective earnings potential and those predicted to face a penalty compared to their pre-unemployment wage display overly optimistic wage expectations. Moreover, wage optimism is amplified by increased job search incentives and job seekers with overoptimistic wage expectations tend to overestimate their reemployment chances. We discuss the labor market implications of wage optimism, as well as the role of information frictions and motivated beliefs as sources of overoptimism.

The supply of politicians affects the quality of democratic institutions. Yet little is known about the economic motivations that drive individuals into politics. This paper examines how experiencing a job loss affects individuals' decisions to enter political life and explores its implications for political selection. Using highly granular administrative data linking individual records of political participation with comprehensive employer-employee data for all formal workers in Brazil, and leveraging mass layoffs for causal identification, we find that job loss significantly increases the likelihood of joining a political party and running for local office. Layoff-induced candidates are positively selected on various competence measures, suggesting that economic shocks improve the quality of political entrants. Further, we observe that the increase in candidacies is more pronounced among laid-off individuals with greater financial incentives from holding office and higher predicted income losses. Finally, using a regression discontinuity design, we find that eligibility for unemployment benefits increases the likelihood of becoming a party member and running for local office. These results are consistent with the reduction in private-sector opportunity costs and the increased time resources explaining the rise in political entry.