Sentiment Analysis (SA) is an indispensable task for many real-world applications. Compared to limited resourced languages (i.e., Arabic, Bengali), most of the research on SA are conducted for high resourced languages (i.e., English, Chinese). Moreover, the reasons behind any prediction of the Arabic sentiment analysis methods exploiting advanced artificial intelligence (AI)-based approaches are like black-box - quite difficult to understand. This paper proposes an explainable sentiment classification framework for the Arabic language by introducing a noise layer on Bi-Directional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)-BiLSTM models that overcome over-fitting problem. The proposed framework can explain specific predictions by training a local surrogate explainable model to understand why a particular sentiment (positive or negative) is being predicted. We carried out experiments on public benchmark Arabic SA datasets. The results concluded that adding noise layers improves the performance in sentiment analysis for the Arabic language by reducing overfitting and our method outperformed some known state-of-the-art methods. In addition, the introduced explainability with noise layer could make the model more transparent and accountable and hence help adopting AI-enabled system in practice.

The recent surge in hardware security is significant due to offshoring the proprietary Intellectual property (IP). One distinct dimension of the disruptive threat is malicious logic insertion, also known as Hardware Trojan (HT). HT subverts the normal operations of a device stealthily. The diversity in HTs activation mechanisms and their location in design brings no catch-all detection techniques. In this paper, we propose to leverage principle features of social network analysis to security analysis of Register Transfer Level (RTL) designs against HT. The approach is based on investigating design properties, and it extends the current detection techniques. In particular, we perform both node- and graph-level analysis to determine the direct and indirect interactions between nets in a design. This technique helps not only in finding vulnerable nets that can act as HT triggering signals but also their interactions to influence a particular net to act as HT payload signal. We experiment the technique on 420 combinational HT instances, and on average, we can detect both triggering and payload signals with accuracy up to 97.37%.