We address the problem of Reliable Broadcast in asynchronous message-passing
systems with
n nodes, of which up to
t are malicious (faulty), in addition
to a message adversary that can drop some of the messages sent by correct
(non-faulty) nodes. We present a Message-Adversary-Tolerant Byzantine Reliable
Broadcast (MBRB) algorithm that communicates
O(∣m∣+nκ) bits per
node, where
∣m∣ represents the length of the application message and
κ=Ω(logn) is a security parameter. This communication complexity
is optimal up to the parameter
κ. This significantly improves upon the
state-of-the-art MBRB solution (Albouy, Frey, Raynal, and Ta\"iani, TCS 2023),
which incurs communication of
O(n∣m∣+n2κ) bits per node. Our
solution sends at most
4n2 messages overall, which is asymptotically
optimal. Reduced communication is achieved by employing coding techniques that
replace the need for all nodes to (re-)broadcast the entire application message
m. Instead, nodes forward authenticated fragments of the encoding of
m
using an erasure-correcting code. Under the cryptographic assumptions of
threshold signatures and vector commitments, and assuming
n>3t+2d, where
the adversary drops at most
d messages per broadcast, our algorithm allows at
least
ℓ=n−t−(1+ϵ)d (for any arbitrarily low
ϵ>0)
correct nodes to reconstruct
m, despite missing fragments caused by the
malicious nodes and the message adversary.