This paper analyzes the Execution Tickets proposal on Ethereum Research, unveiling its potential to revolutionize the Ethereum blockchain's economic model. At the core of this proposal lies a novel ticketing mechanism poised to redefine how the Ethereum protocol distributes the value associated with proposing execution payloads. This innovative approach enables the Ethereum protocol to directly broker Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), traditionally an external revenue stream for validators. The implementation of Execution Tickets goes beyond optimizing validator compensation; it also introduces a new Ethereum native asset with a market capitalization expected to correlate closely with the present value of all value associated with future block production. The analysis demonstrates that the Execution Ticket system can facilitate a more equitable distribution of value within the Ethereum ecosystem, and pave the way for a more secure and economically robust blockchain network.

We present a novel logic-based concept called Space Explanations for classifying neural networks that gives provable guarantees of the behavior of the network in continuous areas of the input feature space. To automatically generate space explanations, we leverage a range of flexible Craig interpolation algorithms and unsatisfiable core generation. Based on real-life case studies, ranging from small to medium to large size, we demonstrate that the generated explanations are more meaningful than those computed by state-of-the-art.

Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) have evolved from being a theoretical concept providing privacy and verifiability to having practical, real-world implementations, with SNARKs (Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge) emerging as one of the most significant innovations. Prior work has mainly focused on designing more efficient SNARK systems and providing security proofs for them. Many think of SNARKs as "just math," implying that what is proven to be correct and secure is correct in practice. In contrast, this paper focuses on assessing end-to-end security properties of real-life SNARK implementations. We start by building foundations with a system model and by establishing threat models and defining adversarial roles for systems that use SNARKs. Our study encompasses an extensive analysis of 141 actual vulnerabilities in SNARK implementations, providing a detailed taxonomy to aid developers and security researchers in understanding the security threats in systems employing SNARKs. Finally, we evaluate existing defense mechanisms and offer recommendations for enhancing the security of SNARK-based systems, paving the way for more robust and reliable implementations in the future.

The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To foster competition and preserve Ethereum's decentralized ethos and censorship-resistance properties, understanding the dominant players' competitive edges is essential. In this paper, we identify features that play a significant role in builders' ability to win blocks and earn profits by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis of MEV-Boost auctions over a six-month period. We reveal that block market share positively correlates with order flow diversity, while profitability correlates with access to order flow from Exclusive Providers, such as integrated searchers and external providers with exclusivity deals. Additionally, we show a positive correlation between market share and profit margin among the top ten builders, with features such as exclusive signal, non-atomic arbitrages, and Telegram bot flow strongly correlating with both metrics. This highlights a "chicken-and-egg" problem where builders need differentiated order flow to profit, but only receive such flow if they have a significant market share. Overall, this work provides an in-depth analysis of the key features driving the builder market towards centralization and offers valuable insights for designing further iterations of Ethereum block auctions, preserving Ethereum's censorship resistance properties.

This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications of CEX-DEX arbitrages for Ethereum's decentralization.

Blockchain technologies underpin an expanding ecosystem of decentralized applications, financial systems, and infrastructure. However, the fundamental networking layer that sustains these systems, the peer-to-peer layer, of all but the top few ecosystems remains largely opaque. In this paper, we present the first longitudinal, cross-network measurement study of 36 public blockchain networks. Over 9 months, we deployed 15 active crawlers, sourced data from two additional community crawlers, and conducted hourly connectivity probes to observe the evolving state of these networks. Furthermore, by leveraging Ethereum's discovery protocols, we inferred metadata for an additional 19 auxiliary networks that utilize the Ethereum peer discovery protocol. We also explored Internet-wide scans, which only require probing each protocol's default ports with a simple, network-specific payload. This approach allows us to rapidly identify responsive peers across the entire address space without having to implement custom discovery and handshake logic for every blockchain. We validated this method on Bitcoin and similar networks with known ground truth, then applied it to Cardano, which we could not crawl directly. Our study uncovers dramatic variation in network size from under 10 to more than 10,000 active nodes. We quantify trends in IPv4 versus IPv6 usage, analyze autonomous systems and geographic concentration, and characterize churn, diurnal behavior, and the coverage and redundancy of discovery protocols. These findings expose critical differences in network resilience, decentralization, and observability. Beyond characterizing each network, our methodology demonstrates a general framework for measuring decentralized networks at scale. This opens the door for continued monitoring, benchmarking, and more transparent assessments of blockchain infrastructure across diverse ecosystems.

Recently, two attacks were presented against Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum: one where short-range reorganizations of the underlying consensus chain are used to increase individual validators' profits and delay consensus decisions, and one where adversarial network delay is leveraged to stall consensus decisions indefinitely. We provide refined variants of these attacks, considerably relaxing the requirements on adversarial stake and network timing, and thus rendering the attacks more severe. Combining techniques from both refined attacks, we obtain a third attack which allows an adversary with vanishingly small fraction of stake and no control over network message propagation (assuming instead probabilistic message propagation) to cause even long-range consensus chain reorganizations. Honest-but-rational or ideologically motivated validators could use this attack to increase their profits or stall the protocol, threatening incentive alignment and security of PoS Ethereum. The attack can also lead to destabilization of consensus from congestion in vote processing.

The multi-chain future is upon us. Modular architectures are coming to maturity across the ecosystem to scale bandwidth and throughput of cryptocurrency. One example of such is the Ethereum modular architecture, with its beacon chain, its execution chain, its Layer 2s, and soon its shards. These can all be thought as separate blockchains, heavily inter-connected with one another, and together forming an ecosystem. In this work, we call each of these interconnected blockchains "domains", and study the manifestation of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV, a generalization of "Miner Extractable Value") across them. In other words, we investigate whether there exists extractable value that depends on the ordering of transactions in two or more domains jointly. We first recall the definitions of Extractable and Maximal Extractable Value, before introducing a definition of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value. We find that Cross-Domain MEV can be used to measure the incentive for transaction sequencers in different domains to collude with one another, and study the scenarios in which there exists such an incentive. We end the work with a list of negative externalities that might arise from cross-domain MEV extraction and lay out several open questions. We note that the formalism in this work is a work in progress, and we hope that it can serve as the basis for formal analysis tools in the style of those presented in Clockwork Finance, as well as for discussion on how to mitigate the upcoming negative externalities of substantial cross-domain MEV.

We argue that the technical foundations of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) remain inadequately understood. Prior research has focused on market dynamics, user behavior, and isolated security incidents, yet systematic analysis of the standards underpinning NFT functionality is largely absent. We present the first study of NFTs through the lens of Ethereum Improvement Proposals (EIPs). We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of 191 NFT-related EIPs and 10K+ Ethereum Magicians discussions (as of July, 2025). We integrate multi-dimensional analyses including the automated parsing of Solidity interfaces, graph-based modeling of inheritance structures, contributor profiling, and mining of community discussion data. We distinguish foundational from emerging standards, expose poor cross-version interoperability, and show that growing functional complexity heightens security risks.

Credible commitment devices have been a popular approach for robust multi-agent coordination. However, existing commitment mechanisms face limitations like privacy, integrity, and susceptibility to mediator or user strategic behavior. It is unclear if the cooperative AI techniques we study are robust to real-world incentives and attack vectors. However, decentralized commitment devices that utilize cryptography have been deployed in the wild, and numerous studies have shown their ability to coordinate algorithmic agents facing adversarial opponents with significant economic incentives, currently in the order of several million to billions of dollars. In this paper, we use examples in the decentralization and, in particular, Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) (arXiv:1904.05234) literature to illustrate the potential security issues in cooperative AI. We call for expanded research into decentralized commitments to advance cooperative AI capabilities for secure coordination in open environments and empirical testing frameworks to evaluate multi-agent coordination ability given real-world commitment constraints.

Ethereum has emerged as a dynamic platform for exchanging cryptocurrency tokens. While token crowdsales cannot simultaneously guarantee buyers both certainty of valuation and certainty of participation, we show that if each token buyer specifies a desired purchase quantity at each valuation then everyone can successfully participate. Our implementation introduces smart contract techniques which recruit outside participants in order to circumvent computational complexity barriers.

We report our experience in the formal verification of the reference implementation of the Beacon Chain. The Beacon Chain is the backbone component of the new Proof-of-Stake Ethereum 2.0 network: it is in charge of tracking information about the validators, their stakes, their attestations (votes) and if some validators are found to be dishonest, to slash them (they lose some of their stakes). The Beacon Chain is mission-critical and any bug in it could compromise the whole network. The Beacon Chain reference implementation developed by the Ethereum Foundation is written in Python, and provides a detailed operational description of the state machine each Beacon Chain's network participant (node) must implement. We have formally specified and verified the absence of runtime errors in (a large and critical part of) the Beacon Chain reference implementation using the verification-friendly language Dafny. During the course of this work, we have uncovered several issues, proposed verified fixes. We have also synthesised functional correctness specifications that enable us to provide guarantees beyond runtime errors. Our software artefact is available at this https URL

A Confirmation Rule, within blockchain networks, refers to an algorithm implemented by network nodes that determines (either probabilistically or deterministically) the permanence of certain blocks on the blockchain. An example of Confirmation Ruble is the Bitcoin's longest chain Confirmation Rule where a block $b$ is confirmed (with high probability) when it has a sufficiently long chain of successors, its siblings have notably shorter successor chains, the majority of the network's total computation power (hashing) is controlled by honest nodes, and network synchrony holds. The only Confirmation Rule currently available in the Ethereum protocol, Gasper, is the FFG Finalization Rule. While this Confirmation Rule works under asynchronous network conditions, it is quite slow for many use cases. Specifically, best-case scenario, it takes around 13 to 19 min to confirm a transaction, where the actual figure depends on when the transaction is submitted to the network. In this work, we devise a Fast Confirmation Rule for Ethereum's consensus protocol. Our Confirmation Rule relies on synchrony conditions, but provides a best-case confirmation time of 12 seconds only, greatly improving on the latency of the FFG Finalization Rule. Users can then rely on the Confirmation Rule that best suits their needs depending on their belief about the network conditions and the need for a quick response.

We present an overview of hybrid Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget (FFG): a Proof-of-Stake checkpointing protocol overlaid onto Ethereum's Proof-of-Work blockchain. We describe its core functionalities and reward scheme, and explore its properties. Our findings indicate that Casper's implemented incentives mechanism ensures liveness, while providing safety guarantees that improve over standard Proof-of-Work protocols. Based on a minimal-impact implementation of the protocol as a smart contract on the blockchain, we discuss additional issues related to parametrisation, funding, throughput and network overhead and detect potential limitations.

The Ethereum block production process has evolved with the introduction of an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), allowing validators to outsource block production to builders and reap Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) revenue from builder bids in a decentralized market. In this market, builders compete in MEV-Boost auctions to have their blocks selected and earn potential MEV rewards. This paper employs empirical game-theoretic analysis to explore builders' strategic bidding incentives in MEV-Boost auctions, focusing on how advantages in network latency and access to MEV opportunities affect builders' bidding behaviors and auction outcomes. Our findings confirm an oligopolistic dynamic, where a few dominant builders, leveraging their advantages in latency and MEV access, benefit from an economy of scale that reinforces their market power, leading to increased centralization and reduced auction efficiency. Our analysis highlights the importance of fair MEV distribution among builders and the ongoing challenge of enhancing decentralization in the Ethereum block building market.

We study the economics of the Ethereum improvement proposal 4844 and its effect on rollups' data posting strategies. Rollups' cost consists of two parts: data posting and delay. In the new proposal, the data posting cost corresponds to a blob posting cost and is fixed in each block, no matter how much of the blob is utilized by the rollup. The tradeoff is clear: the rollup prefers to post a full blob, but if its transaction arrival rate is low, filling up a blob space causes too large delay cost. The first result of the paper shows that if a rollup transaction arrival rate is too low, it prefers to use the regular blockspace market for data posting, as it offers a more flexible cost structure. Second, we show that shared blob posting is not always beneficial for participating rollups and change in the aggregate blob posting cost in the equilibrium depends on the types of participating rollups. In the end, we discuss blob cost-sharing rules from an axiomatic angle.

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) rewards in an on-chain competition, known as the MEV-boost auction. While more than 90% of blocks are currently built via MEV-Boost, trade-offs between builders' strategic behaviors and auction design remain poorly understood. In this paper we address this gap. We introduce a game-theoretic model for MEV-Boost auctions and use simulations to study different builders' bidding strategies observed in practice. We study various strategic interactions and auction setups and evaluate how the interplay between critical elements such as access to MEV opportunities and improved connectivity to relays impact bidding performance. Our results demonstrate the importance of latency on the effectiveness of builders' strategies and the overall auction outcome from the proposer's perspective.

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital. We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market.

In protocols with asymmetric trust, each participant is free to make its own individual trust assumptions about others, captured by an asymmetric quorum system. This contrasts with ordinary, symmetric quorum systems and with threshold models, where all participants share the same trust assumption. It is already known how to realize reliable broadcasts, shared-memory emulations, and binary consensus with asymmetric quorums. In this work, we introduce Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)-based consensus protocols with asymmetric trust. To achieve this, we extend the key building-blocks of the well-known DAG-Rider protocol to the asymmetric model. Counter to expectation, we find that replacing threshold quorums with their asymmetric counterparts in the existing constant-round gather protocol does not result in a sound asymmetric gather primitive. This implies that asymmetric DAG-based consensus protocols, specifically those based on the existence of common-core primitives, need new ideas in an asymmetric-trust model. Consequently, we introduce the first asymmetric protocol for computing a common core, equivalent to that in the threshold model. This leads to the first randomized asynchronous DAG-based consensus protocol with asymmetric quorums. It decides within an expected constant number of rounds after an input has been submitted, where the constant depends on the quorum system.