The generalization of deepfake detectors to unseen manipulation techniques remains a challenge for practical deployment. Although many approaches adapt foundation models by introducing significant architectural complexity, this work demonstrates that robust generalization is achievable through a parameter-efficient adaptation of one of the foundational pre-trained vision encoders. The proposed method, GenD, fine-tunes only the Layer Normalization parameters (0.03% of the total) and enhances generalization by enforcing a hyperspherical feature manifold using L2 normalization and metric learning on it. We conducted an extensive evaluation on 14 benchmark datasets spanning from 2019 to 2025. The proposed method achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming more complex, recent approaches in average cross-dataset AUROC. Our analysis yields two primary findings for the field: 1) training on paired real-fake data from the same source video is essential for mitigating shortcut learning and improving generalization, and 2) detection difficulty on academic datasets has not strictly increased over time, with models trained on older, diverse datasets showing strong generalization capabilities. This work delivers a computationally efficient and reproducible method, proving that state-of-the-art generalization is attainable by making targeted, minimal changes to a pre-trained foundational image encoder model. The code is at: this https URL

State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training references (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small models and datasets. However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today's LLMs. These challenges prompt an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA--one of the strongest MIAs--to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training references on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in four key ways. While (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs, (2) their effectiveness, remains limited (e.g., AUC<0.7) in practical settings. (3) Even when strong MIAs achieve better-than-random AUC, aggregate metrics can conceal substantial per-sample MIA decision instability: due to training randomness, many decisions are so unstable that they are statistically indistinguishable from a coin flip. Finally, (4) the relationship between MIA success and related LLM privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested.

Jailbreak attacks aim to bypass the LLMs' safeguards. While researchers have proposed different jailbreak attacks in depth, they have done so in isolation -- either with unaligned settings or comparing a limited range of methods. To fill this gap, we present a large-scale evaluation of various jailbreak attacks. We collect 17 representative jailbreak attacks, summarize their features, and establish a novel jailbreak attack taxonomy. Then we conduct comprehensive measurement and ablation studies across nine aligned LLMs on 160 forbidden questions from 16 violation categories. Also, we test jailbreak attacks under eight advanced defenses. Based on our taxonomy and experiments, we identify some important patterns, such as heuristic-based attacks could achieve high attack success rates but are easy to mitigate by defenses, causing low practicality. Our study offers valuable insights for future research on jailbreak attacks and defenses. We hope our work could help the community avoid incremental work and serve as an effective benchmark tool for practitioners.

Label Smoothing (LS) is widely adopted to reduce overconfidence in neural network predictions and improve generalization. Despite these benefits, recent studies reveal two critical issues with LS. First, LS induces overconfidence in misclassified samples. Second, it compacts feature representations into overly tight clusters, diluting intra-class diversity, although the precise cause of this phenomenon remained elusive. In this paper, we analytically decompose the LS-induced loss, exposing two key terms: (i) a regularization term that dampens overconfidence only when the prediction is correct, and (ii) an error-amplification term that arises under misclassifications. This latter term compels the network to reinforce incorrect predictions with undue certainty, exacerbating representation collapse. To address these shortcomings, we propose Max Suppression (MaxSup), which applies uniform regularization to both correct and incorrect predictions by penalizing the top-1 logit rather than the ground-truth logit. Through extensive feature-space analyses, we show that MaxSup restores intra-class variation and sharpens inter-class boundaries. Experiments on large-scale image classification and multiple downstream tasks confirm that MaxSup is a more robust alternative to LS. Code is available at: this https URL

Vision AutoRegressive model (VAR) was recently introduced as an alternative to Diffusion Models (DMs) in image generation domain. In this work we focus on its adaptations, which aim to fine-tune pre-trained models to perform specific downstream tasks, like medical data generation. While for DMs there exist many techniques, adaptations for VAR remain underexplored. Similarly, differentially private (DP) adaptations-ones that aim to preserve privacy of the adaptation data-have been extensively studied for DMs, while VAR lacks such solutions. In our work, we implement and benchmark many strategies for VAR, and compare them to state-of-the-art DM adaptation strategies. We observe that VAR outperforms DMs for non-DP adaptations, however, the performance of DP suffers, which necessitates further research in private adaptations for VAR. Code is available at this https URL.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.